Introduction
The pricing of add-on or contingent services provided in addition to a base good has been the focus of much theoretical and policy speculation. This study examines the customer costs associated with providing one such add-on good, bank overdrafts which are offered as an additional service for personal current accounts (also termed checking accounts) i . We examine this question by testing if the explicit and implicit costs of using personal current accounts varies significantly with whether the account offers an overdraft facility or otherwise. Explicit customer costs include packaged fees for accessing the account and implicit costs are defined as the difference in interest rate yields offered on personal current account deposits and yields from instant access deposit accounts offered contemporaneously by the same provider. This assessment, augmented by consideration of a wide range of service attributes, employs a data set of 222 personal current accounts and 1,200 deposit accounts offered monthly between 1995 and 2011 in the UK.
Using a descriptive assessment and regression model, we report providing an overdraft facility is significantly associated with the customer costs of using base services (deposit and payments services) in personal current accounts. The direction of this relationship is not, as a widely predicted, from overdraft services to other personal current account users. Alternatively the presence of an overdraft facility increases the customer costs of using current account base services. This assessment indicates that implicit or inertia costs of personal current account use may be more influential than previously reported in the pricing of these services.
The research question is important to address as academics and policymakers have reported overdraft users may subsidise other personal current account customers. For example Armstrong and Vickers (2012) Examining this question in the UK is timely as while a diversity of approaches are used to price personal current accounts internationally, the 'free banking' pricing model, dominant in the UK since the 1980s, is increasingly being used in Ireland, Australia and the USA (see Central
Bank of Ireland 2012, Australian Senate 2011, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2013).
In this payment model, the customer pays for personal current account 'base services'
indirectly and compensates the provider directly for overdraft use through contingent fees and additional charges. The indirect costs of using base (deposit and payment services) services include depositing funds in personal current accounts receiving relatively low levels of interest and the payment of merchants or interchange fees by retailers (see Schmiedel et al. 2012) .
Increasingly these indirect costs for accessing personal current account base services have been augmented by the promotion of accounts with a 'packaged' fee payable for accessing the account.
Regulators and legislators in Australia (Australian Senate 2011), the European Union This study contributes to this debate by considering if the provision of an overdraft facility in a personal current account affects the customer costs of using such an account. If the assumption that overdraft lending is cross-subsidising other personal current account services is reliable, we would expect the customer costs of using payment and deposit (base) services of personal current accounts offering an overdraft facility to be lower relative to accounts which do not offer such a facility. As this relationship is not observed for the UK personal current market over a 17 year period, this regulatory, policy and theoretical assumption may require further analysis. We suggest inert customers which accumulate large deposits in their personal current accounts may be paying far more for personal current account services than previously acknowledged.
The study is divided into five sections. After this introduction, academic literatures are examined. In the third section the data and empirical design are introduced and the results are discussed in the fourth section. The conclusions and implications of the study are then provided.
Literature review
In light of the preceding discussion, any literature review of personal current accounts and overdraft costs could consider a diversity of concerns and for compactness we examine three areas. Initially we review the developing theoretical literatures pertaining to contingent charges and how these have been applied to personal current account markets. Secondly, the empirical work undertaken on the provision of, demands for and the pricing of personal current account services are outlined. Lastly we consider the past regulatory examinations of this market with a focus on UK contributions.
Theoretical literature on contingent charges and current account pricing
Contingent charges, such as overdraft costs, are applied to goods and services purchased in an aftermarket, in addition to and after a base good or service is obtained through a primary market. While contingent charges provide pricing efficiencies for firms by allocating costs to those customers using additional services, they also present challenges. In particular concerns arise when firms can exercise market power over an aftermarket and levy high contingent charges and fees.
Shapiro (1995) reports four circumstances when market power within aftermarkets develops.
Initially, customers may be surprised by firms unexpectedly raising prices in aftermarkets; an outcome leading customers to switch provider when possible. Secondly, if customers are poorly informed and fail to account for the costs of using aftermarkets due to optimism or the costs of comprehending charges, firms can maximise profits from an aftermarket. This may result in firms escalating competitive actions in the primary market to obtain additional aftermarket customers (Bennett 2011) . Third, when firms have a limited ability to make credible or binding price and quality commitments at the time of the base good purchase, incentives for firms to maximise profits in aftermarkets arise. Lastly, if the firm is able to exclude rivals from aftermarkets, the ability to price discriminate is enhanced.
Concerns have also emerged that firms may also exaggerate customers' decision making biases through contingent charging. This assumption is central to an expanding theoretical literature assessing the market interaction between profit maximising firms and 'boundedly rational', 'myopic', 'naïve' or 'less informed' consumers. This work considers the firms' strategic use of confusing pricing schemes to enhance consumers' decision errors. For example Gabaix and Laibson (2006) indicated circumstances where exploitation of customers' weakness in comprehension and decision making by firms may persist under competitive conditions in the joint pricing of base and add-on goods. Subsequently cross subsidies may flow from profits achieved on add-on goods purchased by less informed customers, to subsidise base goods purchased by all customers. In the presence of myopic customers high rents in aftermarket or add-on good markets persist even in the face of increasing base market competition (Miao 2010 ).
As financial services markets are characterised by limited consumer comprehension and financial literacy (FSA 2006 , Worthington 2007 , Agarwal et al 2008 and personal current accounts markets are associated with high switching costs and employ a diversity of pricing formats, this theoretical literature appears apposite for this market. Despite this relevance, links between this market and such theory have been piecemeal, with the notable exception of Armstrong and Vickers (2012) . These authors examined the pricing of overdrafts viewing these services to be a tied aftermarket complimentary yet distinct from primary or base personal current account services (deposits and payment services). The model assumes customers are confronted by small print or confusing pricing formats when choosing a personal current account. Diligent customers' which can observe this small print and comprehend pricing formats, can take inefficient actions to choose a personal current account with the lowest overall usage costs. Distinctly naïve customers are misled by small print and confusing pricing formats and unnecessarily incur fees. As these naïve customers will be unaware of high overdraft costs, they will choose the lowest cost provider of base personal current account services (deposit and payment services) unaware of the additional or contingent charges for overdraft use.
These differential actions for naïve and diligent customers result in two possible outcomes. If there is a large proportion of naïve customers and the aftermarket prices are high, firms will actively compete in the primary market for personal current accounts and charge more for additional overdraft services. These actions result in overdraft use subsidising the personal current account base services and naïve customers subsidising diligent customers. This outcome raises concerns as to inefficient patterns of pricing being created and the redistribution of costs between customer groups. Alternatively, if there are enough diligent customers or low enough contingent charges then efficient contract terms will develop and no cross-subsidy will emerge. As,
Empirical literature on pricing current accounts
To date there is a scarcity of non-US academic work examining personal current accounts and overdraft pricing. 
Regulatory contributions
The personal current account market has also been the focus of repeated regulatory attention in the UK and internationally. This has resulted in a distinct literature examining overdraft costs and usage, current account pricing and the competitive conditions prevailing in the personal current account and associated overdraft markets. For the UK these inquiries have been influenced by the fragmented and dynamic regulation of this market over the sample Commission on Banking 2011). Reports have also examined specific services provided within personal current accounts including overdrafts (OFT 2008 (OFT , 2011 (OFT , 2013 (OFT , 2014 CMA 2014) Persistent concerns raised in these reports have included limited customer switching, high barriers to entry and complex pricing formats.
Within this array of reports perhaps the most significant intervention was provided by the now defunct Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in its investigation as to the competitive conditions prevailing within the unauthorised overdraft market (OFT 2008 , 2011 , Competition and Markets Authority 2014 . This competition and consumer protection agency reported that the unauthorised overdraft market and the personal current account market were not working well due a lack of transparency and complexity in pricing, which concentrated competition on more visible fees and charges. The 'free banking' pricing model was considered to result in relatively low interest rates for deposits within personal current accounts and overly high levels of interest and fees for overdraft lending. This scenario troubled this regulator as it was assumed the poor, 
Data and Methodology
To address whether an overdraft facility influences the cost of personal current account use we undertake a descriptive assessment and employ a regression model. The descriptive assessment examines the relationships between the cost of personal current account use, the services received with the accounts and the availability of an overdraft facility or otherwise. The regression model is used to examine statistical significance of the presence or otherwise of an overdraft facility on the costs of personal current account 'base' (deposit and payment services) services in the presence of attributes of personal current accounts.
Assumptions and Concepts
In order to undertake the assessment three assumptions are made and require explanation.
Initially the costs of using deposit and payment services within personal current accounts are defined as base costs. These base costs vary between the personal current accounts as accounts will have varying interest levels offered for current account deposits, distinct packaged fees and may levy these fees and pay interest with different frequencies (i.e. monthly, annually etc.).
For reasons outlined in the data section, overdraft costs are not directly quantified and the presence or otherwise of an overdraft service is used to reflect the cost or benefit of providing this service.
Second, to accommodate the opacity of charging for personal current accounts, we measure the implicit costs of account use. Implicit costs are those costs of using personal current accounts Further this approach provides a measure of customer costs arising due to inattention and inertia (see Anderson et al 2014, Stango and Zinman 2014) .
A third assumption underlying the analysis is that the costs of using base services are determined by how the personal current account is used by a customer. Preferably customer use is defined using personal current account transactions. As this data is not publically available in the UK we consider an alternative method previously used by regulators (e.g. In total three representative customer definitions which use both base and overdraft services are outlined (with costs only recorded for base costs in the analysis). To reduce subjectivity in defining the levels of customer use, we adopt one existing OFT (2008) representative customer classification derived from a prior assessment of personal current account transaction data. We also follow the approach used by the Competition Commission (2008) to define two further representative customers by interviewing senior bankers with a remit for personal current account provision. Interviews were therefore undertaken with four senior representatives from a very large and a small provider of UK personal current account services and led to two more representative customer definitions. These definitions are outlined in Table 1 .
Competition

INSERT TABLE 1
Data
The empirical analysis employs data from Moneyfacts PLC for the retail personal current account market and the instant access deposit market. This data was accessed from paper based magazines and transformed into a useable dataset for this project. The data is comprehensive iv , includes personal current accounts with and without packaged fees v , includes basic bank accounts vi and accounts with and without an overdraft facility. All these accounts provide a deposit facility and offer some payment services (so are defined as personal current accounts rather than deposit account). These accounts are provided primarily by high street banks, yet also by building societies, small banks, foreign banks and other firms including insurers and retailers. For personal current account deposit services we record four different tiers or levels of interest payable for sums deposited including:
i) Equal to and greater than £1 deposited and less than £500, ii) Greater than or equal to £500 deposited and less than £1,000, iii) Greater than or equal to £1,000 and less than £2,500, and, iv) Greater than or equal to £2,500 and less than £5,000.
While some personal current accounts offer higher rates of interest for sums greater than £5,000 deposited this data was not reported by Moneyfacts PLC and was not available for this study.
Therefore this assessment is effectively truncated to considering personal current accounts containing £5,000 in deposits or less. The frequency of interest rate payment is also recorded and used to ensure any calculations undertaken match the frequency employed by the personal current account (i.e. monthly, quarterly and annually). Where a personal current account requires a packaged fee, the fee amount and frequency of fee payment was recorded. Data is also recorded as to how personal current accounts are distributed and what payment services are provided by these accounts. These product characteristics (e.g. account sweeping, cheque book, unlimited direct debits etc.) are not comprehensive due to the availability of data, yet assist in indicating the differential quality of personal current accounts offered to market. We acknowledge that other forms of distribution, payment services and additional services are not included in this assessment.
While considerable data on overdraft interest rates, buffers, arrangement and usage fees has been obtained for authorised and unauthorised overdrafts, we have been unable to collect a full set of data relating to additional fees for customers using unauthorised overdrafts, such as letter costs, rejected direct debit and cheque costs. As the omission of unauthorised overdraft charges will understate the level of unauthorised overdraft use costs and we do not wish to interpolate data, these values are not included in this assessment.
INSERT TABLE 2
Using the approach specified above, 'representative' customers are used to calculate the base costs of personal current account use. The Moneyfacts data set is provided monthly over a 17 year period, for 345 current accounts offered by 71 firms, which are owned by 61 parent companies. This data is truncated to only include those personal current accounts for which both personal current account and instant access deposit observations are available and where personal current accounts have been offered for two years or more. The removal of data where matching instant access deposit and personal current accounts observations were unavailable, primarily affects smaller and foreign banks. We have also removed personal current accounts which were only offered briefly. Some accounts may have been offered for purely marketing purposes such as obfuscation (Carlin and Manso 2010) or bait and switch activities (Lazear 1995) and their inclusion could have distorted the analysis. This provides a contiguous data set of 222 products offered by 42 firm and 34 parent firms; in total 16,667 observations within an unbalanced panel of 222 products and 204 months over a 17 year period. The panel is unbalanced as firms have introduced and withdrawn products over the sample period.
To estimate implicit costs these personal current account observations are matched with the average interest rates available for the instant access deposit accounts provided by the same parent company. The instant access deposit data has 56,909 monthly observations of 1,200 instant access deposit accounts. Descriptive statistics of fees and interest rates used to calculate base costs of current account use and implicit costs of current account use are presented in Table 3 .
The unit of observation for the analysis is therefore the cost of using a particular personal current account. This is recorded monthly over the sample period for 222 products for the three representative customers. The decision to use the product rather than the firm level as a unit of observation is informed by the relatively frequent merger and acquisition of personal current account providers over the sample period (see DeYoung et al. 2010) . This has resulted in many personal current account products changing ownership yet continuing to operate with the same brand name and product features. The parent firms (ultimate owners) marketing these personal current accounts are listed in Appendix 1. 
INSERT TABLE 3
The lower panel reports the construction of implicit costs for the three representative customers. Initially, three sets of interest rate: a) the interest rate of the personal current account deposit service, b) the average interest rate of an instant access deposit account and c) the prevailing base or policy rate are reported. The yield from depositing three levels of funds (£830, £2,000 and £400 for representative customers A, B and C) is then calculated using the appropriate interest rate and frequency and is reported as the average annual yield. These yields vary from very low returns on personal current account deposits to higher returns from average instant access deposit accounts and the highest returns from depositing at the base rate. The implicit customer costs of using a personal current account deposit relative to sweeping these funds into an instant access deposit account or depositing these funds at the base rate is then recorded. It is observed that implicit costs are far higher when base rates are used, suggesting the use of base rates may overestimate implicit costs. As access to retail deposits actually offering the base rate is unusual and due to the relatively high implicit costs arising when this rate is used, the level of implicit cost is defined as personal current account deposit yield minus the average instant access deposit yield.
Methods
The descriptive assessment examines whether a personal current account offering an overdraft facility or otherwise affects the costs of using base services. This question is examined for the three representative customers and accommodating the 'quality' of personal current account services. The first part of this assessment is undertaken overall and for three time periods (1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-11) . We then use quartiles denoting relative customer costs to examine personal current accounts which do and do not offer an overdraft facility. If overdrafts, as 'addon' services, do reduce the price of base services, it is expected more personal current account observations which have an overdraft facility will be recorded in the lowest cost quartile.
Similarly, a higher percentage of observations of personal current accounts without an overdraft facility would be expected in the highest cost quartile. This assessment is reported in Table 4 .
High costs of using base personal current account services may also reflect differences in the quality of these accounts. Therefore we examine if variables denoting 'quality' of personal current accounts and the base costs of using these accounts are associated. This is again undertaken overall and using quartiles denoting relative customer costs. In the quartile analysis we discriminate between higher and lower quality by counting the number of forms of distribution and total number of payment services offered on each personal current account observation. When a personal current account is available through all forms of distribution and offers all the possible payment services it is denoted as having a higher quality. Where a personal current account is offered through a limited number of distribution channels and provides few payment services it is judged to be of a lower quality.
Lastly, we examine whether the firm offering the personal current account may be accruing economies of scale. As the personal current accounts examined are provided by firms with varying involvement in the UK retail banking market just examining asset size of institutions could provide a misleading perspective vii . We therefore represent scale of involvement within retail banking markets through examining whether the firm has a national branch network or otherwise, following the classification used by Ashton and Gregoriou (2014) and reported in Appendix 1. The differences in base costs for customers A, B and C for nationally branching firms and other institutions are recorded together with the assessment of product quality in Table 5 .
The regression 'test' follows the descriptive assessment and is used to determine if the availability of an overdraft facility in the personal current account has an influence on the costs of using accounts' base services. If the availability of an overdraft facility influences the cost of base services then a dummy variable indicating whether the personal current account observation has or does not have an overdraft facility would be expected to be significant. If the presence of an overdraft facility reduces the cost of using base services, then the expected coefficient sign will be negative. If the presence of an overdraft facility is costly for a bank to provide the expected direction of the coefficient would be positive.
The costs of using personal current account base services for the three representative customers are also assumed to be determined by a range of other factors including the wholesale cost of funds, the services offered within the personal current account, product restrictions and how the personal current account is distributed. The panel data model to be estimated is written as:
where i (i = 1, 2,…, n) denotes personal current account products, t (t = 1, 2,…, T) denotes months, Yit is the it th observation of the dependant variable (personal current account base costs for the three representative customers) and Xit is the it th observation of the explanatory variables outlined in Table 2 .  represents the coefficient vector of the explanatory variables, ft represents the time effects in the model and the error term uit may be written as uit = i + it where i represents the time invariant individual specific effects and it denotes the remaining error.
To determine the appropriate estimator for the regression we undertake a number of steps. As financial institutions and their subsequent product decisions are exposed to similar kinds of systematic shocks, we test whether cross-company residuals are contemporaneously correlated. by Blundell and Bond (1998) are not relevant to our dataset. This is because a vast majority of our explanatory variables are dummies, which are by definition exogenous explanatory variables. We therefore adopt the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) econometric methodology in our empirical analysis.
We accept the panel could be considered to be a three dimensional panel consisting of products, firms and time. We control for products in the cross section and for time within the panel. We cannot encapsulate the firm effect as well, yet do account for shocks to firms by using the SUR estimator. We could in principle control for firms in the cross section instead of the products but that would limit our analysis to 42 cross sections instead of 222, which would make our empirical estimates significantly weaker. This testing framework therefore examines the dependent variable, the costs of personal current account use for the three representative customers, over 222 products and for 204 time periods.
Results
The descriptive assessment
The descriptive assessment is reported in two tables. Table 4 considers the influence of offering an overdraft on the costs of using base personal current account services (upper panel) and differences in customer costs in quartiles (lower panel). The differences between the 'quality' of personal current account services and whether an account provides an overdraft facility or otherwise is provided in Table 5 . In the upper panel of this table, the differences between these costs of using base services are indicated for accounts with and without overdraft facilities. In the middle panel the distribution of higher and lower 'quality' personal current accounts are recorded relative to whether the account offers an overdraft facility or otherwise. In the lower panel, the relationship between firms with and without a national branch network and the base costs is recorded.
In Table 4 we observe when a personal current account is offered with an overdraft, the costs of using base services are higher. These differences are significant using t tests. There is also a higher dispersion of customer costs when personal current accounts have an overdraft rather than when not. The assessment of the customer costs using quartiles supports this general finding. For the majority (75%) of cells, there are relatively more observations from accounts with no overdrafts rather than otherwise in the lowest cost quartile. For the highest cost quartile there are relatively more observations for personal current accounts offering an overdraft facility. We also test if these distributions of observations are independent using a  2 test; in all cases, independence is rejected.
In Table 5 we examine the differences between the 'quality' of personal current accounts when an account offers an overdraft facility or otherwise. It is reported that more personal current account payment services are observed when an account offers an overdraft. Personal current accounts providing an overdraft facility are also accessible through a greater number of distribution channels be these branch, telephone or over the internet, relative to accounts not offering overdrafts. In all cases the differences between the occurrence of these service attributes and whether the account is offered with and without an overdraft are significant. The quartile assessment of distribution of higher and lower 'quality' personal current accounts bears out this observation and we see the highest quality quartile is overwhelmingly populated by personal current account observations offering overdraft facilities. The hypothesis that this distribution is independent is rejected in all cases using a  2 test.
Lastly, the relationship between base costs and firms with and without a national branch network is examined. When considering firms with a national branch network relative to other firms, national branching firms offer a higher proportion of personal current accounts with an overdraft (73% to 62%). It is reported that national branching banks have higher average base costs for all representative customers. We acknowledge this scale influence can be interpreted in different ways. This could indicate economies of scale are not a strong influence in this assessment and this marketplace. Alternatively, the downward pressure on customers costs exercised by offering an overdraft could reflect a scale effect affecting this entire market and distorting these results.
Overall, from the descriptive assessment a mixed picture is forwarded. In our discussion of theory, it was predicted a personal current accounts offering an overdraft would be expected to have lower base costs. The findings reported in Table 4 contradict this prediction as a positive relationship between offering an overdraft in a personal current accounts and base costs is reported. This result is further complicated by the existence of personal current accounts with different levels of service quality. We observe that personal current accounts offering an overdraft also provide more product features and are available through more distribution channels. We do not observe evidence supportive of the predictions of the theory.
In Table 6 we report the regression results. The coefficient for a personal current account offered with overdraft services is statistically significant at the 5% level for all representative customers. The direction of the relationship is positive indicating providing an overdraft facility adds rather than reduces the costs of using base services. The regression model also indicates other factors have a statistically significant influence on the costs of using personal current account base services. The method of distributing current accounts positively influences the costs of using base services with statistically significant and positive coefficient values for all branch and telephone variables, yet not for internet distribution. The provision of payment services such as account sweeping, cheque books and unlimited direct debits also has a positive and significant influence on the costs of using base services. The influence of the base rate on the cost of using base current account services is statistically significant for two of the three representative customers and negative in all cases. Lastly, the fixed and time effects are significant, suggesting that the product and time-specific shocks differ significantly across the accounts in our sample justifying the use of the panel.
INSERT TABLES 5, 4, and 6
Conclusions
Despite the theoretical and policy importance of contingent charges, empirical examination of the operation and level of these pricing techniques is limited. Perhaps reflecting this lack of empirical investigation, the distribution of customer costs arising from contingent charges has become an issue of public, political and policy concern in some markets and particularly in the provision of personal current accounts and overdraft services. In this market, policy makers, parliamentarians, regulators and theorists have all reported the provision of overdraft lending in a 'free banking' system can lead to a cross-subsidy of all personal current account users from customers opting to use overdraft services. This study empirically examines an aspect of this prediction by testing whether offering an overdraft facility or otherwise is associated with higher or lower costs of using personal current account base services.
The descriptive assessment reports the customer costs of using personal current accounts with an overdraft facility are higher rather than lower. This relationship is complicated by the 'quality' of the personal current account. We therefore undertake a regression assessment of what factors influence the base costs of customer use of personal current accounts. It is reported that having an overdraft is positively associated with the customer costs of using personal current accounts. Many other factors also have a positive influence on current account costs including variables used to represent product quality and distribution. These results do not concur with theoretical predictions that overdrafts, as an overpriced 'add-on' service are predicted to reduce the costs of personal current account base services. Alternatively the provision of personal current account services appear to be financed as much by implicit costs arising from inattentive customers allowing large deposits to accumulate in their accounts.
Personal While such ongoing policy efforts to enhance customer information and choice are welcome, we suggest these should be accompanied by measures to reduce the implicit and inertia costs of personal current account use. Specifically, the default enrolment of customers into systems of automatic redirection or sweeping of funds to and from deposit accounts will lessen implicit costs and minimise overdraft charges. Lastly, further research of pricing formats is required. In this study we observe that the implicit costs of deposit use, the least visible personal current account costs appears to be substantial. These concerns with the pricing of less visible fees, charges and benefits, previously raised by regulators (e.g. OFT 2008 OFT , 2011 OFT , 2013 Notes AOD = authorised overdraft; UOD = unauthorised overdraft The direction of the relationship depends on whether offering an overdraft positively or negatively influences the customer' costs of using current accounts. Average wholesale cost of funds
The average base or policy rate issued by the Bank of England for the month considered. If the market is linked to the cost of funds then a significant positive influence is expected. Account sweeping If customers have a facility to automatically sweep excess current account funds to another financial account (such as a deposit account), the size of current deposits will be curtailed. This will therefore be costly for the bank and have an expected positive influence on the base costs.
Cheque book
The ability to use cheques is additional convenience for customers, yet costly to provide. Therefore a positive relationship is expected.
Unlimited direct debit
This indicates if there are no restrictions on the use of the direct debit system through the UK BACS payment system. This is expected to exert a positive influence on base costs.
Distribution of PCA branches, internet and telephone The use of one or a combination of distribution channels are expected to have differing influences on base costs depending on their costs to provide. Branches are widely viewed to be the highest cost and internet provision the lowest cost forms of distribution. Minimum credit balance.
If the current account requires customers to pay their primary income into this account. This requirement is expected to have a negative influence on base costs as it will be associated with a higher use of the deposit function, yet also may add to the costs of payment services. i The personal current account or checking account market is characterised by the use of different terminology internationally due to distinct laws, regulations and traditions as to how retail banking business is undertaken. As the subject of the paper is the UK, terminology from the UK is employed employing terms widely used in this nation and employed in law, regulation and government reporting.
For example a personal current account (PCA) is a term used to describe a bank account offering payment services, such as direct debits and credits, standing orders and other forms of payment, deposit services and in many cases an optional overdraft facility. The term personal current account has long been used in nations with a UK banking heritage and refers to bank accounts similar to 'checking accounts', a term more widely used in North America. Other UK terms employed in this study include 'instant access deposit' -this is a deposit account offered by financial intermediary for the deposit of funds which may be accessed without prior notice being given to the bank. These accounts are also termed sight deposits in some other nations. Packaged or access fees are the fees payable for accessing some personal current accounts. Authorised and unauthorised overdrafts is borrowing undertaken through the personal current account with and without prior agreement of the provider. Throughout the study we refer to the deposit and payment services provided within a personal current account as a base good and an overdraft facility as an add-on service which is provided through an overdraft aftermarket.
ii Many other academics have also reported the presence of a distributional cross-subsidy in personal current or checking account markets. For example Campbell et al (2010) Schuh et al (2010) examine the presence of cross-subsidies in US credit card markets.
iii While discussion of the wider functions of the payments system is beyond the scope of this study, reviews are provided for the UK and Nordic nations by Milne (2006) and for the USA by Gerdes (2008) . iv The data provided by Moneyfacts PLC is also used by financial and competition law regulators in the UK including the Bank of England and the Competition Commission in addition to providing a key source of comparison for many UK based financial institutions and financial advisors. This data has been provided since 1989, yet has only been provided in a consistent format for personal current accounts since 1995. v Packaged accounts are personal current accounts which are provided on payment of a fee. It is common for these personal current accounts to offer a range of different payment services, be distributed through an assortment of channels and offer a range of additional services such as travel or identity insurance. vi Basic bank accounts are personal current accounts developed and issued in the UK to combat financial exclusion amongst certain and often less wealthy individuals. These accounts offer limited payment services and often do not provide access to overdraft services. vii For example, some large North American institutions, such as Sun Bank or Citi operate in the UK on a relatively small scale.
